U.S. War Strategy in Iraq Had an Asian Flair
by James Holmes
The Iraq war was a strikingly multicultural enterprise. Waged largely by an English- speaking coalition, Operation Iraqi Freedom bore the unmistakable imprint of Chinese philosophy. Indeed, the name of Sun Tzu, author of ''The Art of War,'' popped up in U.S. military briefings at least as often as did that of Carl von Clausewitz, the best-known Western student of warfare.
Why? Because the debacle in Vietnam impelled U.S. Military commanders to rethink the conventional-war mindset that had contributed to America's first defeat, and because advances in technology - sensors, communications gear, and precision arms - gave them the wherewithal to remake the American way of war along radically different lines.
Sun Tzu, a Chinese general of antiquity, furnished many of the principles behind this ultramodern transformation process. And there's little question Sun shaped the coalition's strategy in Iraq. Both Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks, who masterminded the campaign to topple Saddam Hussein, listed him among their favorite philosophers and quoted him lavishly.
Sun's influence isn't a passing fad. Under a law enacted in the 1980s, no officer can become a general or admiral without graduating from one of the nation's war colleges, where ''The Art of War'' is a mainstay of the curriculum. Consequently, his influence among the senior echelons of the armed forces is assured for years to come.
Small wonder he surfaces so often in discussions of contemporary military strategy. But what could Sun Tzu, who wrote over two millennia ago, possibly have to tell postmodern America about fighting? Quite a bit. He urged on his readers a fluid kind of strategy predicated on deception, indirection, and maneuver. Three of his insights in particular bear on Operation Iraqi Freedom.
First, the wise general shied away from fixed campaign plans. He had to continuously adapt to conditions, attacking enemy weaknesses while keeping clear of enemy strongholds. ''Now an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strength and strikes weakness... And as water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions.''
Flexibility, then, was the keystone of success. Indeed, proclaimed Sun Tzu, ''one able to gain the victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine.''
Sun would have upbraided the Western pundits who, mere days into the fighting, were needling coalition spokesmen because stiffer-than-expected resistance from Iraqi irregulars had caused some minor setbacks and prompted adjustments to the coalition's strategy.
Second, battlefield intelligence was crucial. Where Sun Tzu was forced to rely on ''secret agents'' to keep the general abreast of the enemy's doings, the U.S. Military deployed high-tech sensors. General William F. Kernan, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Joint Forces Command, told Congress that the ability to ''gather, analyze, and share critical information electronically allows us to fulfill Sun Tzu's dream (of) a common picture of the battle.''
Able to monitor events throughout the theater of conflict and communicate orders rapidly to combat units on and above the battlefield, top commanders can now orchestrate operations with an agility that would astonish even Sun Tzu.
Finally, Sun prescribed a strategy of indirection founded on the concept that ''normal forces'' (cheng) should fix or distract the enemy though head-on engagements while ''extraordinary forces'' (ch'i) operated on the enemy's flanks, probing for weak spots and striking when the opportunity presented itself.
Using normal and extraordinary forces in concert, the commander could multiply the force of his army - keeping the enemy in disarray and unable to mount a defense. ''(T)he potential of troops skillfully commanded in battle may be compared to that of round boulders which roll down from mountain heights... Thus one need use but little strength to achieve much... The force applied is minute but the results are enormous.''
In a very real sense, the United States used air power in the cheng role, pummeling Iraqi ground units from aloft while allowing the 3rd Infantry Division and the 1st Marines to function in the capacity of ch'i. The speed with which coalition ground forces advanced, their readiness to bypass urban areas, and the uncertain axis of attack on Baghdad kept the Iraqis off-balance - magnifying the impact of the Army and Marines in ground combat.
Sun Tzu boasted, ''If a general who heeds my strategy is employed he is certain to win. Retain him!'' Heartened by the easy victory in the Gulf, America will undoubtedly keep hiring Sun's disciples - and heeding his wisdom.
James Holmes is a senior research associate at the University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security, a former professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, and a combat veteran of Desert Storm. Article republished with permission by author.
The Iraq war was a strikingly multicultural enterprise. Waged largely by an English- speaking coalition, Operation Iraqi Freedom bore the unmistakable imprint of Chinese philosophy. Indeed, the name of Sun Tzu, author of ''The Art of War,'' popped up in U.S. military briefings at least as often as did that of Carl von Clausewitz, the best-known Western student of warfare.
Why? Because the debacle in Vietnam impelled U.S. Military commanders to rethink the conventional-war mindset that had contributed to America's first defeat, and because advances in technology - sensors, communications gear, and precision arms - gave them the wherewithal to remake the American way of war along radically different lines.
Sun Tzu, a Chinese general of antiquity, furnished many of the principles behind this ultramodern transformation process. And there's little question Sun shaped the coalition's strategy in Iraq. Both Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks, who masterminded the campaign to topple Saddam Hussein, listed him among their favorite philosophers and quoted him lavishly.
Sun's influence isn't a passing fad. Under a law enacted in the 1980s, no officer can become a general or admiral without graduating from one of the nation's war colleges, where ''The Art of War'' is a mainstay of the curriculum. Consequently, his influence among the senior echelons of the armed forces is assured for years to come.
Small wonder he surfaces so often in discussions of contemporary military strategy. But what could Sun Tzu, who wrote over two millennia ago, possibly have to tell postmodern America about fighting? Quite a bit. He urged on his readers a fluid kind of strategy predicated on deception, indirection, and maneuver. Three of his insights in particular bear on Operation Iraqi Freedom.
First, the wise general shied away from fixed campaign plans. He had to continuously adapt to conditions, attacking enemy weaknesses while keeping clear of enemy strongholds. ''Now an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strength and strikes weakness... And as water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions.''
Flexibility, then, was the keystone of success. Indeed, proclaimed Sun Tzu, ''one able to gain the victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine.''
Sun would have upbraided the Western pundits who, mere days into the fighting, were needling coalition spokesmen because stiffer-than-expected resistance from Iraqi irregulars had caused some minor setbacks and prompted adjustments to the coalition's strategy.
Second, battlefield intelligence was crucial. Where Sun Tzu was forced to rely on ''secret agents'' to keep the general abreast of the enemy's doings, the U.S. Military deployed high-tech sensors. General William F. Kernan, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Joint Forces Command, told Congress that the ability to ''gather, analyze, and share critical information electronically allows us to fulfill Sun Tzu's dream (of) a common picture of the battle.''
Able to monitor events throughout the theater of conflict and communicate orders rapidly to combat units on and above the battlefield, top commanders can now orchestrate operations with an agility that would astonish even Sun Tzu.
Finally, Sun prescribed a strategy of indirection founded on the concept that ''normal forces'' (cheng) should fix or distract the enemy though head-on engagements while ''extraordinary forces'' (ch'i) operated on the enemy's flanks, probing for weak spots and striking when the opportunity presented itself.
Using normal and extraordinary forces in concert, the commander could multiply the force of his army - keeping the enemy in disarray and unable to mount a defense. ''(T)he potential of troops skillfully commanded in battle may be compared to that of round boulders which roll down from mountain heights... Thus one need use but little strength to achieve much... The force applied is minute but the results are enormous.''
In a very real sense, the United States used air power in the cheng role, pummeling Iraqi ground units from aloft while allowing the 3rd Infantry Division and the 1st Marines to function in the capacity of ch'i. The speed with which coalition ground forces advanced, their readiness to bypass urban areas, and the uncertain axis of attack on Baghdad kept the Iraqis off-balance - magnifying the impact of the Army and Marines in ground combat.
Sun Tzu boasted, ''If a general who heeds my strategy is employed he is certain to win. Retain him!'' Heartened by the easy victory in the Gulf, America will undoubtedly keep hiring Sun's disciples - and heeding his wisdom.
James Holmes is a senior research associate at the University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security, a former professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, and a combat veteran of Desert Storm. Article republished with permission by author.